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On 12th October 2008 I attended a conference at which an epidemiologist stood up and said "My job is to tell you something you don't want to know, and ask you to spend money you haven't got on something you don't think is going to happen." I taught pandemic preparedness on the basis of his example for the next 12 years.
Tierney (2008) provided a functional semantic classification of the size of extreme events (revised by Alexander 2016, p. ) The next question is where to draw the boundaries in the study of disasters and practice of disaster riskreduction. Disaster riskreduction policy is heavily influenced by the class of disaster involved.
The lessons of the Covid-19 pandemic, alas largely negative, show that a good civilian system designed to protect the public against major hazards and threats can save thousands of lives and billions in losses and wasted expenditure. Non-seasonal influenza retains the potential to cause a pandemic on the level of that of 1918-1920.
Some additional key riskreduction steps SVB took early on were: They required a pledge of half of a startup’s shares as collateral (Reduced later to seven percent). When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, the tech industry was not immune to the economic fallout. This opened a close working relationship within the VC world.
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