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On 12th October 2008 I attended a conference at which an epidemiologist stood up and said "My job is to tell you something you don't want to know, and ask you to spend money you haven't got on something you don't think is going to happen." I taught pandemic preparedness on the basis of his example for the next 12 years.
Since the start of the crisis, I have constantly affirmed that the key to understanding the effects of this pandemic is the UK Government's failure to give adequate weight to emergency planning and management (Alexander 2020a, 2020b). The scenario for this pandemic (excluding the recovery) was fully formulated over the period 2003-2009.
What does all this mean for Britain? But in 2008 floods stretched from Alnwick in Northumberland to Tewksbury in Somerset, nearly 500 km away. Oddly, it was sidelined during the pandemic as the Cabinet Office Minister, Michael Gove, judged it to be 'too extreme'. So much for the personal reflections. Was this not a disaster?
Tierney (2008) provided a functional semantic classification of the size of extreme events (revised by Alexander 2016, p. ) d) Intentional disasters, comprising all forms of terrorism and sabotage. (e) Pandemics are included because many of the effects of a pandemic are likely to be socio-economic in nature. Girgin and A.
The lessons of the Covid-19 pandemic, alas largely negative, show that a good civilian system designed to protect the public against major hazards and threats can save thousands of lives and billions in losses and wasted expenditure. Non-seasonal influenza retains the potential to cause a pandemic on the level of that of 1918-1920.
Technology All of the above points are enabled with technology that the 60’s would have marveled at. The 2008 hotel attacks in Mumbai would have been difficult if not impossible without technology. Attacks like Ohio State and London Bridge only require impulse and forethought, and are impossible to mitigate and counter.
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